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Abstract—Single Sign-on (SSO) authentication was introduced 
to overcome the problem of password memorability issue by 
enabling the users to login once using a set of username and 
password that allows an access into multiple websites. Among 
several SSO protocol, OpenID is said to offer flexibility and 
security. Unfortunately, the existing OpenID model is prone to 
phishing attack due to lack of countermeasures to ensure 
authenticity of OpenID provider. In view of the proliferation of 
phishing attack that exposed users to fraud website, information 
theft and unauthorized disclosure, this study attempts to identify 
and propose a suitable countermeasure in order to thwart 
phishing attack in OpenID environment. Therefore, this study 
intends to develop a prototype that implements Page Token in 
order to mitigate phishing attack. The findings revealed that the 
Page Token is possible to minimize the potential risk of phishing 
attack. 
 
Index Terms—OpenID; Page Token; Phishing Attack; Single 
Sign-On (SSO). 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is an enormous growth of digitalized applications in the 
websites today as people’s reliance on the Internet technology 
continues to grow rapidly. Despite of these contributions, 
security issues become the key concern to the user. It resulted 
in every users must have their username and password to log 
in into various websites which consequently creates burden for 
the users to cope with memorizing too many passwords. This 
ranges from criminals activities including phishing attack, 
man-in-the-middle attack and eavesdropping in which the 
service providers and online business operators have suffered 
both brand reputation damage and financial losses [1]. In the 
same vein, the unwary users have lost thousands of dollars due 
to unhealthy disclosure of their credentials at this malicious 
site. 
OpenID was introduced as a decentralized and user-centric 
protocol in Single Sign-On (SSO) system environment [2]. 
This protocol was chosen based on main characteristic of 
OpenID authentication that provide a single user identifier to 
log in into the websites that support this technology [3]. It 
started with user creating an identity at the OpenID provider, 
and then directed to link the identity to any of the relaying 
party that is available and use it later as the main key in order 
to authenticate the application. The existing OpenID protocol 
gives the permission to the users to log in and entering 
relaying party by giving authentication permission from an 
OpenID provider.  
This enables OpenID to accelerate up the authentication 
process by allowing the users to sign in with a single click. It 
also reduces frustration associated with maintaining multiple 
username and password. This protocol also can gain greater 
control over user online identity. Despite the advantages as 
mentioned, there are several vulnerabilities and security 
limitations with regards to the implementation of OpenID such 
as spam, session hijacking, authentication bugs and phishing 
attack. Among these issues, phishing attack was highlighted 
because it was very dominant and has been focused by many 
researchers and practitioners [1]. 
In OpenID, phishing attack happened when users enter 
OpenID URL to the redirected website. The attacker will 
redirect the victims to the website in order to compromise 
Identification Provider (IdP) and acts as legitimate user. 
Phishing scams have been escalating in number of 
sophistication. It continues to rise in quantity and quality that 
captured for both client and server side. The cyber criminals 
use phishing attack to obtain private information whether by 
social engineering or technical subterfuge technique [4]. The 
existing OpenID model is said to experience this problem and 
hence prone to phishing attack.  
The literatures have suggested a concept of using token as 
the possible countermeasure for phishing attack [1], [5]. 
Nevertheless, this proposed countermeasure did not 
specifically mention about the method of token in the domain 
of SSO. Based on the study, the possible token is intangible 
and should be embedded in the architecture of OpenID 
environment. Therefore, this study intends to propose a 
prototype, which introduces an intangible countermeasure to 
overcome these issues in order to thwart phishing attacks. 
This study has been conducted in order to achieve the 
following objectives: (i) to identify the type of countermeasure 
that can minimize the issues of phishing attack, (ii) to develop 
the prototype by incorporating the identified countermeasure 
(iii) to evaluate the functionality of the prototype.  
The following sections of this paper will discuss further on 
related work including some of the existing solutions. A 
section then follows it to detail out the existing OpenID model 
highlighting the weakness that prone to phishing attack. Next, 
the research methodology will be discussed followed by the 
prototype of OpenID model, which was produced in this 
study. Finally, the section ends with some insightful 
discussion, conclusion as well as some future work to be 
undertaken. 
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II. RELATED WORK 
 
The technology advances have encouraged more online 
transactions such as banking, shopping and many others. The 
main advantage of this is on the convenient aspects among 
users. In order to facilitate this scenario, users need to open an 
account and each of these accounts requires set of username 
and password. As the hype of online transactions becomes part 
of daily life, numbers of online accounts increases and thus 
resulted in users having multiple sets of usernames and 
passwords. This has created a burden on human memory to 
memorize a lot of username and password which is known as 
password fatigue [2]. In order to solve these problems, SSO 
authentication relieves the user from burden of having 
multiple credentials by improving the user experience and also 
the security [6].Unfortunately, the adoption of SSO is still not 
very encouraging due to many skeptical existed among users 
especially with regards to issues like spamming, session 
hijacking and not to mention the most popular being phishing 
attack.    
Currently, the most effective countermeasures for phishing 
attack is highly depending on user awareness. Most of the 
users will be using the same username and password for all the 
websites. In this case, if any of the websites is malicious, the 
attacker can easily gain personal information and obtained the 
user credentials to gain access to the other websites that use 
the same IdP. Furthermore, when there is the fake website, 
users easily believe the website and directly login their 
username and password. Therefore, this countermeasure 
cannot solve the problem because the lack of knowledge and 
awareness that leads to phishing attack [7]. 
The second countermeasure that commonly used to 
overcome phishing attack is the Secure Socket Layer (SSL). 
This countermeasure is embedded in the OpenID protocol. 
However, the main limitation of this countermeasure is that 
SSL requires for certificate and approval to get linked to the 
certificate. It has slow data transmission according to the 
monitoring process and takes much time to complete 
encryption and decryption process [8]. This makes SSL 
insufficient to protect OpenID protocol from being 
compromised due to high cost to setup trusted infrastructure 
from the providers. 
Another countermeasure that is used to overcome phishing 
attack is by using One-Time Password (OTP). It is also known 
as dynamic password, which is an unpredictable serial of 
numbers generated by specified algorithm. In this 
countermeasure, one password only works one time to avoid 
account being theft. However, the vulnerability exists if the 
authentication server is compromised. The algorithm used to 
provide passwords is a possible point of attack. If the hacker 
collected one-time passwords for a period of months and built 
up a large sample, then it might be possible to guess the 
algorithm and seed data used [9]. 
These three countermeasures were prominent and classified 
as well known solution in order to mitigate the phishing 
attack. Besides that, there are several other possible 
countermeasures which are considered as non-prominent 
solutions. They are nonce, cookies and browser fingerprints. 
In this case, the countermeasures operate by web server, which 
can reset the connection if any network anomalies were 
detected. The system will register the web browser when the 
users request the services. The limitation of these 
countermeasures is the attacker can obtain the transmission by 
stealing the session ID of the user [10]. The following Table 1 
summarizes all the existing countermeasures based on the 
literature review. 
 
Table 1 
The Summary of Existing Countermeasures to Overcome Phishing Attack 
 
Countermeasures Advantages Limitations 
Related   
Literatures 
User awareness 
 
Helping users recognize appropriately to the 
potential security concerns. 
 
Make the users aware of their computer; network, 
and mobile devices are vulnerable. 
 
Reduce the cost of control measures into system to 
prevent network attack. 
The users are not alert about latest 
information related to network attacks. 
 
Time constraint to conduct security 
awareness training, display security 
awareness posters and reminder to the users. 
 
Lack of rules and regulation for each user. 
[7],[11], 
[12],[13] 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
 
Keep sensitive information sent across the Internet 
safely and only intended recipient can read it. 
 
Can gain the trust from the users using this protocol. 
 
Remain high cost to setup trusted 
infrastructure from the providers. 
 
Downgrade the performance of server 
resources due to encryption process by the 
server. 
[8],[13], 
[14],[15] 
One-Time Password (OTP) 
 
Only use one password to endless supply in a secure 
way. 
 
Dedicated into the device including mobile phones 
and computer. 
 
 
Valid only once for authentication and may 
not be used twice. 
 
OTP was generated in randomized which 
have possibility to compromises the account. 
[9],[16], [17] 
Others (Nonce, Cookies and 
Browser Fingerprints) 
Register the user system browser when user request 
service from web server. 
Web server will reset the connection if anomalies 
detected. 
The attacker can obtain the URL, reset a user 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
connection and steal the user session ID. 
[10],[18], [19] 
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From the above summary, the concept and characteristic 
that have not been covered of each solution will be improvise 
and implemented in the proposed countermeasure using the 
prototype in order to mitigate and thwart phishing attacks. The 
methodology undertaken for this study will be discussed in the 
next section. 
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
 
This study comprises of three main phases as summarized in 
Table 2 below. The first phase of begins with preliminary 
study where researcher critically analyzes the literature based 
on journals, articles, books and also some of the related 
research being done by previous researcher in the domain of 
OpenID, SSO authentication and phishing attack. The aim of 
this phase is to identify the problems, requirements necessary 
to solve the problems and also the limitation of the research. 
This phase has pointed out some of the principles, ideas and 
concepts that is required by the application of SSO 
authentication in more details. It has also identified Page 
Token as the possible countermeasure that can be used to 
mitigate the issue of phishing attack in OpenID. 
 
Table 2 
Software and Tools Requirements in Prototype Development 
 
Phase Activities Involved Output 
Phase 1: 
Problem 
Identification 
Doing some 
literature, review of 
journal, article, 
book and related 
research and study. 
 
Identify the 
problem statement 
of this study. 
 
Understand the 
requirement and 
limitation of the 
study 
The principles and concept that 
will require and applied in this 
study such as SSO in general, 
OpenID and Phishing attack. 
 
The problem statement, research 
objective, research question, 
scope and significant of the 
research. 
 
The requirement and limitation of 
the study. 
 
The conceptual idea of proposed 
countermeasure. 
Phase 2: 
Construct and 
develop 
prototype 
Identify the tool 
that can be used for 
combining page 
token into OpenID. 
Software and hardware 
requirement. 
 
The implementation of conceptual 
idea in the proposed mechanism. 
Phase 3: 
Testing 
Testing the 
prototype and 
monitor the 
development 
process. 
The evaluation of prototype 
implementation and verification 
process. 
 
Based on the outcome of phase one, it is then followed by 
the second phase that is developing the prototype that 
incorporates the proposed countermeasure. This phase was 
intended to implement the conceptual idea of the proposed 
countermeasures based on the requirement that have been 
finalized in the phase one. The outcome of this phase is a 
prototype that implements the Page Token as the 
countermeasures to mitigate the phishing attack. The final 
phase of this study involved testing procedure to verify the 
functionality of the prototyped developed. This process will 
involve testing the prototype that is expected to produce a 
unique token every time the user executes the authentication 
process. The verification process will be implemented based 
on unique token and the type of authentication process. As a 
deliverable output, this phase will determine whether the 
proposed countermeasure is able to function well in order to 
mitigate the possibility of phishing attack.  
The software and tools requirement that was involved in the 
prototype development phase were itemized in the following 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Software and Tools Requirements in Prototype Development 
 
Components Software and Tools 
Operating System Windows and Macintosh 
SSO Tools 
Google Platform (Google 
Console Developer)  
Programming Platform 
Relying Party (RP) 
(Salesforce.com) 
Web Browser Internet Explorer 
 
The Google Console Developer and Salesforce.com were 
chosen in this prototype according to the features that can be 
integrated with OpenID authentication that embedded with 
Page Token in order to thwart phishing attack. These tools 
were integrated with core architectural elements such as 
multitenancy, security, performance, availability, meta-data 
customization and also integration via web services [20]. The 
next section will elaborate further on the architecture of the 
prototype. 
 
IV. ARCHITECTURE OF THE PROTOTYPE 
 
The previous study discovered a vulnerability that occurred 
between user and IdP whereby the intruders can interrupt the 
transaction using phishing attacks. The highly dependency on 
this single set of username and password makes it vulnerable 
and prone to attacks particularly phishing attack [21]. In order 
to mitigate the phishing attack and ensure a secure 
communication between user and IdP, the prototype has 
implemented a countermeasure known as Page Token that acts 
as second credential to the existing set of username and 
password.  
This study introduces the concept of Page Token as a 
countermeasure that allows the authorized access to the 
system and services. This countermeasure was differing from 
others in term of method and architecture. It is applying the 
concept of intangible token in the form of page that carries the 
additional embedded code. Although the concept of token 
considered is not new and has been implemented previously, 
there is less of implementation and specific verification that 
related to this countermeasure in OpenID environment. In our 
study, the concept of Page Token will be implemented in the 
domain of OpenID and considered as improvise 
countermeasure in the sense of the token architecture and 
prototype in order to mitigate phishing attack.  
This countermeasure provides an extra level of assurance 
based on an approach known as two-factor authentication. It 
may look similar like Transaction Authorization Code (TAC) 
that sends via mobile phone in order to complete the bank 
transaction. But in this process, we are using email transaction 
in OpenID environment due to the architecture and SSO 
characteristic that pertaining to the authorization and 
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authentication process. 
The user has a common password, which authorized them to 
login the system. Using Page Token, the security code will be 
sent to the user in order to complete the login purposes. The 
security code is used to prove the user's identity and change 
frequently due to request from the user. It has 6 character of 
alphanumeric and can be combining with string format that 
automatically generated. Each token was unique to the specific 
user, cannot be re-use and case sensitive. 
Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of the prototype. The 
normal transaction in openID environment will begin with 
requested resources by the user, followed by response given 
by IdP with OpenID authentication protocol. The user will 
send back the valid credential that is validated by IdP. Next, 
the coding will post by the user and finally the Relying Party 
(RP) will grant the access and permission to the user in order 
to access the system.  
In this study, the concept of Page Token was implemented 
in step 4 onwards (refer Figure 1 below) whereby the phishing 
attack was detected due to lack of mutual authentication 
between user and IdP. The email that contained of security 
code was sent to the user in order to authenticate the system 
and execute all the process between IdP and RP. The process 
was performed separately with transaction of OpenID 
authentication protocol to the user in order to increase the 
security and reducing the chance of been hacked by 
unauthorized user. Upon receiving the security code, the users 
have to combine with common password in order to login to 
the system.  
 
 
Figure 1: Architecture of the Prototype 
 
In the context of implementation, this countermeasure 
attempt to filter the fake website by requesting the security 
code as a second credential to the user. If the website have 
been counterfeiting by third party in order to perform phishing 
attack, the system will fail to send the security code to the 
user’s email. At the end of this process, the authentication will 
be aborted and terminated due to prevent the system from 
being access by the unauthorized user. 
 
V. PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT 
 
Prototype development section will be elaborate accordingly 
to the architecture of the prototype in the previous section. In 
order to implement the architecture of prototype that proves 
the Page Token mechanism, we have chosen the Google 
Console Developer and Salesforce.com as the tools and 
programming platform to complete the task.  
Figure 2 and Figure 3 shows the screenshot of WebTest 
development in Google Console Developer and the sample of 
login page in Salesforce.com that have been customized in 
order to develop the Page Token prototype in OpenID 
environment. In this case, the user has two options to complete 
the authentication process, whether to use the conventional 
method using username and password or using OpenID 
approach that connected to Gmail account that implement the 
concept of SSO. The development process is simultaneously 
operated between user, RP and IdP starting with the user 
request for authentication in Salesforce.com. Next, RP will 
response with point redirects into the web and launch the 
OpenID authentication protocol.  
 
 
Figure 2: Web Test Development in Google Console Developer 
 
In order to complete this process, The domain setting in 
Salesforce.com need to be configured and filled as shown in  
Figure 4. This section is required in order to create the 
relationship between Google Console Developer and 
Salesforce.com platform in OpenID environment using Gmail 
account for the middle communication. 
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Figure 3: Login Page using OpenID 
 
    
 
 
Figure 4: Domain Setting in Salesforce.com 
 
The authentication provider also has been setup as shown in  
Figure 5. The setting was proposed in order to prepare the 
Page Token for mitigating the phishing attack. Basically, this 
section provides two functions, one for creating the 
authentication provider that connecting to Google Console 
Developer and Salesforce.com and the other are related to the 
process of determining the token and user endpoint based on 
provided consumer key. The Gmail account was chosen as 
Email OpenID Profile due to Google requirement and 
specification. In the end of this process, the default Salesforce 
Configuration URL will be display for initializing process that 
consist of test, SSO and callback pages which will insert into 
WebTest development in Google Console Developer setting. 
In order to give the privilege to the legitimate user, we have 
managed the user and give the authorization based on profile 
and type of user. Figure 6 illustrates the process of user 
management according to registered email.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Authentication Provider Setting in Salesforce.com 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Managing Users in Salesforce.com 
 
This process used to identify and control the state of users 
logged into the system and reduce the risk of phishing attack. 
This filtering method was implemented and unauthorized 
users are not allowed to authenticate the system. The 
following  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Sample of Apex Coding for Authentication 
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Figure 7 indicates the sample of code that embedded in the 
Apex Code to show the flow of the process in implementing 
the Page Token as a second credential that communicates with 
Gmail.  The Gmail account was function as an instrument to 
retrieve the security code, which sending through email as a 
second credential. In this case, the prototype has been 
programmed to communicate with the email and the Page 
Token will be sending directly to the user. During the 
transaction, some information required for generating the 
token is hidden. If the user changes the password of the email, 
the Page Token also will we change. 
Figure 8 shows the content of security code in Page Token 
that was send by the Salesforce.com to the user through 
Gmail. The proposed mechanism implements the unique token 
and has a different code for every request. Thus, the risk of 
missing token is limited within different request. The risk also 
can be reducing by giving token expiration time in order to 
avoid unauthorized people being access to the code. This 
second credential is very important to face any intercepted in 
the middle phishing attack in the unsecured environment. The 
server has capability to recognize if the request came from 
authorize or unauthorized user by using this mechanism. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: The Content of Verification Code in Page Token 
 
The verification code has shown in Figure 9 that was 
requested to the user in order to complete the process of 
authentication. This code will used as security code and has 
been sent to the user as a Page Token through Gmail account. 
The user is required to enter the code and verify the system to 
finish the task. Furthermore, Salesforce.com as an IdP will 
validate the credential and the coding will automatically post 
to the RP. The main page will be show to the user as granted 
access after successful login, as shown in Figure 10.  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Verification Code through Page Token 
 
 
Figure 10: The Main Page after Successful Login 
 
VI. PROTOTYPE TESTING 
 
In general, we have conducted several preliminary tests on 
our prototype. The testing approach was implemented based 
on two methods; Fake website with OpenID and without Page 
Token, and fake website with OpenID together with Page 
Token. The phishing attack was based on spam email phishing 
technique. With this technique, the phishers may send the 
same email to millions of users, requesting them to fill in and 
complete the personal details related to Salesforce.com. The 
information details will be used by the phishers for their 
illegal activities such as unauthorized and confidential data 
disclosure.  
This common phishing scam messages may have an urgent 
note that requires the user to enter credentials to update 
account information, change details, and verify accounts. 
Sometimes, they may be asked to fill out a form to access a 
new service through a link that is provided in the email. The 
sample of spam email phishing technique was show in the 
following Figure 11. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Sample of Spam Email in Phishing Technique 
 
In this simple test by the administrator, we are trying to 
login to the system based on the link that attached in the email. 
We will be redirected to the fake Salesforce.com website and 
login using conventional techniques which requires username 
and password. We also try to complete the authentication 
process using OpenID option in the related counterfeit 
website. The OpenID option in the fake website need for 
Google login even though we have login the Gmail account in 
previous session. Overall, this experiment was conducted 
without security awareness in order to test the functionality of 
the Page Token. 
From this experiment, the result shows that the Page Token 
can mitigate the phishing attack and blocking an authorized 
user to access the website. The Figure 12 shows the message 
for invalid username, password and security token that is refer 
to security code that was show in the end of this experiment. 
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Figure 12: Message for Invalid Username, Password and Security Token 
 
And finally, the message shows the error of the 
authentication as shown in Figure 13 that determined 
unauthorized user could not penetrate the prototype if they 
were supported by Page Token as second credential in 
authentication process.  
 
 
 
Figure 13: Error Message when Penetrated by Unauthorized User 
 
Both experiment of phishing attack shows the same result 
that unauthorized user cannot complete the authentication 
process due to Page Token mechanism that was implemented 
in the prototype specifically in OpenID environment.  
 
VII. DISCUSSION 
 
This study has developed a prototype to implement the 
proposed countermeasures for mitigating the problem of 
phishing attack known as Page Token. The objective of having 
this proposed countermeasure is to secure the communication 
between user and RP due to the phishing attack is proven 
possible to happen. In general, the prototype developed has 
shown that the Page Token countermeasures function well and 
to certain extent manage to mitigate the phishing attack 
problem.  
From the prototype development and testing process, we 
have identified that using the combination of password and 
security code in OpenID environment are more efficient and 
secure rather than using single ID or password. It secures the 
credential and can act like additional security layer in the 
prototype. It also can be integrated in other platform and help 
the user to gain trust when reaching unsecure site and 
webpage.  
On the hand, this countermeasure has fulfill the requirement 
mentioned by Lee [5] in their research regarding to new anti-
phishing method in OpenID whereby the token approach was 
suggested in order to prevent phishing attack. Besides 
phishing attack, the researcher also mentions that the concept 
of Page Token is also possible to mitigate the problem of 
session hijacking. Furthermore, this suggested method easily 
realizable and can protect from phishing attack that do not 
require the third certificate from a third party.  
The prototype development also has demonstrated that the 
Page Token is successfully implemented in the mutual 
authentication environment that is between user and RP. 
During the process of SSO in OpenID, lack of verifying 
process between User and RP will cause the phishing attack. 
Based on the prototype developed, this study also 
acknowledges several limitations. First, the Page Token was 
tested to mitigate phishing attack that is caused by the email 
spams. Thus, as mentioned in the literature [22], phishing 
attack may exist in several other are techniques which requires 
further testing to confirm the suitability of the proposed 
countermeasures to mitigate the problem. Until then, our claim 
for this proposed countermeasure suit for phishing attack only. 
Secondly, we come to realize that the element of user 
awareness still plays an important role in mitigating this 
phishing attack. Although the proposed countermeasure can be 
put in place to mitigate this problem, users can still fall as prey 
of this vicious phishers who normally resort to social 
engineering technique.  
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
Phishing activities have indeed reached epidemic 
proportions with the increasing availability to perform the 
attack, which simplifies the creation of fake websites. In this 
paper, the concept of Page Token as a countermeasure was 
presented and discussed using related prototype. Our 
architecture detected the weaknesses of OpenID transaction 
that is prone to phishing attack and tries to create a solution by 
adding the second credential technique. This is achieved 
through the implementation of Page Token that can strengthen 
the transaction and prevent interruption between user and RP 
in order to mitigate phishing attack.  
However, this countermeasure needs to be tested with the 
various type of phishing attack due to the process that only can 
solve the common and certain scenario of phishing attack. 
Since the phishing attack become more sophisticated, the 
multiple solution that related to this countermeasure should 
considered and need a further evaluation in order to mitigate 
most of phishing attack. Future work will consider the third 
credential using encryption technology specifically in public 
and private key in order to thwart phishing attack. Moreover, 
we will determine the effectiveness of Page Token that can 
integrate with encryption technology.   
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